It is often claimed that a scientific theory cannot be confirmed; it can be only falsified. I will argue that an experimentally supported theory cannot be proven wrong in its area of applicability where its predictions have been experimentally confirmed. Such a conclusion becomes most clear when two aspects of the correspondence principle - epistemological and ontological - are identified. These aspects clarify the sense in which an old theory is a limiting case of the new one that replaces it. The epistemological aspect of the correspondence principle deals with theories that describe the same level of reality (such as Newtonian mechanics and relativity), whereas the ontological aspect works for theories describing neighboring levels of reality (such as Newtonian and quantum mechanics). I will also argue that it is reasonable to expect that a given level of reality may be adequately described by a final theory. A theoretically infinite number of theories, however, will be necessary for the description of an infinite number of levels.

Date: Tuesday, October 28, 2003
Time: 4:00 PM
Place: Concordia University, Loyola Campus, Science Pavilion (Building SP), 7141 Sherbrooke Street West, 3rd Floor
Room: SP 365.01
Contact: (514) 848-2424 ext 2595

Note: There are regular shuttle buses traveling between Sir George Williams Campus (1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W.) and Loyola Campus; see Shuttle bus schedule.